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Comment
ON THE ROAD AGAIN: HOW BRNOVICH STEERS STATES
TOWARD INCREASED VOTER RESTRICTIONS
KAITLIN BARNES*
For nearly fifty years, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (“VRA”) protected
American elections.1 For nearly fifty years, America had a system in place
to eliminate existing tools of voter discrimination and prevent new barriers
from being erected.2 And for nearly fifty years, the VRA worked as
intended.3 America has never treated its citizens truly equally, but the VRA
was an effective attempt at leveling the playing field in an arena in which so
much power is vested: the political process.4
After the VRA’s passage, registration and turnout rates for voters of
color in the South skyrocketed.5 Discrimination did not disappear overnight,
as states were increasingly creative in developing new ways to suppress
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1. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437-46 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. §§ 10301-10314, 10501-10508, 10701-10702).
2. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 571 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that
the VRA prevented nearly 1,200 discriminatory laws from going into effect between 1965 and
2006).
3. See Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2354 (2021) (Kagan, J.,
dissenting) (“And for decades, Section 5 operated as intended.”).
4. See, e.g., Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that no descendant of an
enslaved person could be an American citizen); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding
state-imposed racial segregation); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (allowing the
forced internment of citizens of Japanese descent).
5. Desmond Ang, Do 40-Year-Old Facts Still Matter? Long-Run Effects of Federal Oversight
under the Voting Rights Act, 11 AM. ECON. J.: APPLIED ECON. 2019 1, 3 (2019) (finding that the
VRA led to gains in voter participation that persisted for forty years).

1265

1266

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:1265

voters of color.6 But the VRA was designed to catch these attempts, and it
usually did.7 With each VRA reauthorization, Congress tweaked what was
not working, and kept what was.8 As a result, our country seemed to be
moving towards a political process that was slowly but surely becoming
equally accessible to all voters.9
But America’s dedication to voting rights did not last forever. In Shelby
County v. Holder,10 the Supreme Court put America back on the road to voter
suppression by striking down the VRA’s most effective provision, which
required certain states to receive federal approval before changing their
voting laws.11 Predictably, states that had been prevented by the VRA from
passing restrictive voting legislation rushed to enact laws that made it more
difficult for voters of color to cast a ballot.12 The Court’s most recent voting
rights decision, Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee,13 weakened the
VRA’s most important remaining provision, Section 2, which broadly
prohibits discriminatory voting practices.14 By ignoring the factors
established in Thornburg v. Gingles15 that governed Section 2 claims for
years, Brnovich makes it significantly harder for plaintiffs to successfully
challenge voting laws under Section 2.16
The Brnovich Court also recognized the prevention of voter fraud as a
“strong and entirely legitimate” interest that could justify passing a law that
may place additional burdens on voters.17 This recognition gives states the
green light to pass restrictive voting legislation under the guise of preventing
voter fraud.18 It also suggests that the Court’s decision-making process was

6. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1968) (“The right to vote can be affected
by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.”).
7. See id. at 565.
8. The VRA originally required reauthorization after five years. The reauthorization period
was extended to seven years in 1975 and to twenty-five years in 1982 and 2006. See infra Section
I.A.2.
9. See Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 202 (2009) (noting that in
2009, voter turnout and registration rates approached parity in jurisdictions covered by the VRA).
10. 570 U.S. 529 (2013).
11. Id. at 557.
12. See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, The South After Shelby County, 2013 SUP. CT. REV. 55,
60 (2014) (noting that soon after Shelby County was decided, officials in Alabama, Florida,
Mississippi, North Carolina, Texas, and Virginia announced plans to pass stricter voting laws).
13. 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021).
14. See infra Section II.A.1.
15. 478 U.S. 30 (1986).
16. See infra Section II.A.1.
17. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2340.
18. See infra Section II.B.
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not grounded in reality, as voter fraud is incredibly rare and does not impact
the outcome of American elections.19
Part I of this Comment will discuss America’s simultaneously tragic and
triumphant history of voting rights.20 It will examine the conditions that led
to the passage of the VRA and describe how the Court upheld the legislation
against constitutional attacks.21 Part I will also explore the Court’s approach
to interpreting the VRA in Shelby County and Brnovich.22 Finally, Part I will
survey the voting legislation that has been proposed by state legislatures and
Congress.23
Part II of this Comment will argue that the Court’s most recent voting
rights decision, Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, weakens the
VRA—and by extension the right to vote—even further.24 First, Part II will
explain how the Brnovich Court improperly ignored its precedent in two
other VRA cases.25 Next, Part II will show why the Court’s recognition of a
“voter fraud” state interest is so concerning.26 Finally, Part II will identify
the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act as the law best poised to
address the Court’s concerns about the VRA’s constitutionality.27 By
restoring the VRA and updating its provisions to apply to all states, this Act
is a course correction that will prevent our country from continuing down the
path of increased voter restrictions.28
I. BACKGROUND
Since its passage in 1965, the VRA has been America’s primary piece
of federal voting legislation.29 Two decisions, Shelby County v. Holder and
Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, have significantly changed the
way the VRA operates in modern elections by invalidating and weakening
some of the law’s most important provisions.30 As a result, states are now

19. See infra Section II.B.
20. See infra Part I.
21. See infra Section I.A.
22. See infra Section I.B.
23. See infra Section I.C.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Section II.A.
26. See infra Section II.B.
27. See infra Section II.C.
28. See infra Section II.C.
29. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437-46 (codified as amended at 52
U.S.C. §§ 10301–10314, 10501–10508, 10701–10702).
30. See Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013) (finding Section 4(b) of the VRA
unconstitutional); Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2338–40 (2021) (creating
a new set of standards to evaluate legislation challenged under Section 2 of the VRA).
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able to make sweeping changes to their election laws that restrict ballot
access and disparately impact voters of color.31
This Section provides an overview of: (1) the VRA, including its
legislative history and reauthorizations;32 (2) two recent cases, Shelby County
and Brnovich, in which the Court eroded key sections of the VRA;33 and (3)
state and federal legislation that addresses voting.34
A. Congress Designed the VRA to Address Racial Discrimination in
Voting
Because prior efforts to eliminate voter discrimination had failed,
Congress designed the VRA to eradicate the tools of blatant discrimination
and prevent states from enacting new laws that would disenfranchise voters
of color.35 Throughout its history, Congress reauthorized the VRA and
tweaked the legislation to respond to new forms of discrimination.36
Although the VRA was effective at closing registration and turnout gaps,
many states persisted in their efforts to disenfranchise voters of color,
rendering the VRA’s protections necessary.37
1. The VRA Addressed the Shortcomings of Previous Voting Rights
Legislation
The VRA was not the federal government’s first attempt at tackling the
issue of voter discrimination.38 After the states ratified the Fifteenth
Amendment,39 Congress tried to guarantee formerly enslaved people the right
to vote by passing the Enforcement Act of 1870,40 which made it a crime for
public officers and private citizens to prevent others from voting.41 But
enforcement of the law quickly became “spotty and ineffective.”42 As a result
of this lax enforcement, in 1890, many Southern states began to enact literacy
31. See, e.g., 2021 Ga. Laws 14 (SB 202); 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (SB 1); see infra Section
I.C.1.
32. See infra Section I.A.
33. See infra Section I.B.
34. See infra Section I.C.
35. See infra Section I.A.1.
36. See infra Section I.A.2.
37. See infra Section I.A.3.
38. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310–13 (1966) (detailing statutes and lawsuits
that attempted to challenge racial discrimination in voting).
39. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 (“The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous
condition of servitude.”).
40. Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870) (repealed 1894).
41. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 310.
42. Id.
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tests and other measures that were “specifically designed” to prevent Black
citizens from voting.43
Because Congressional action targeting specific electoral practices
failed to prevent discrimination, the strategy to combat voter discrimination
focused on individual lawsuits.44 However, almost as soon as a court could
respond to a law, states would pass another, slightly different law that
continued to disenfranchise voters of color.45 In this way, early attempts to
address race-based voter discrimination were like “battling the Hydra[:]
Whenever one form of voting discrimination was identified and prohibited,
others sprang up in its place.”46 Using lawsuits to target voting practices in
individual states was ineffective for several reasons, including the amount of
time and effort required to prepare for trial.47 Additionally, attacking voter
discrimination using lawsuits did not proactively prevent discrimination, but
rather addressed problems after voters had already been disenfranchised.48
Congress passed the VRA in 1965 after concluding that “the
unsuccessful remedies” of the past needed to be replaced by “sterner and
more elaborate measures.”49 Several features of the VRA made it effective
at reducing and preventing voter discrimination.50 First, Section 2’s broad
discrimination prohibition allowed plaintiffs to challenge any “voting
qualification or prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice, or procedure”
that resulted in the denial or abridgement of the right to vote on account of
43. Id. at 310–11. States using literacy tests also adopted tools such as grandfather clauses to
ensure that illiterate white citizens could still vote. Id. at 311.
44. Id. at 313 (noting that the Civil Rights Acts of 1957, 1960, and 1964 did “little to cure the
problem of voting discrimination”); id. at 311 (listing a line of cases that struck down specific
discriminatory tools, such as grandfather clauses and all-white primaries).
45. Id. at 314 (“Even when favorable [court] decisions have finally been obtained, some of the
States affected have merely switched to discriminatory devices not covered by the federal decrees
. . . .”); see, e.g., Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (holding that a Texas statute violated the
Fourteenth Amendment by creating whites-only primaries); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944) (holding that a Texas statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment by allowing the Texas
Democratic Party to require all voters in its primary to be white); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461
(1953) (holding that a Texas political association violated the Fifteenth Amendment by excluding
Black voters from participating in its primaries).
46. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 560 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
47. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 314.
48. Id. at 315; see also Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 572 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“Litigation
occurs only after the fact, when the illegal voting scheme has already been put in place and
individuals have been elected pursuant to it, thereby gaining the advantages of incumbency.”).
49. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309. Of course, Congress did not reach this conclusion on its own;
the tireless efforts of Black leaders within the Civil Rights Movement created the political
momentum that led to the VRA’s passage. See generally ARI BERMAN, GIVE US THE BALLOT: THE
MODERN STRUGGLE FOR VOTING RIGHTS IN AMERICA (2015) (detailing how civil rights leaders
used marches and protests to bring attention to voting rights).
50. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 560 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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race or color.51 Next, Section 4’s coverage formula brought jurisdictions with
a history of voter discrimination under the supervision of the federal
government.52 Finally, Section 5’s preclearance requirement mandated that
these covered jurisdictions get their voting legislation approved, or
“precleared,” by the federal government.53 A proposed voting law would
only be approved if it did not have the purpose and would not have the effect
of “denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color.”54
The combination of Section 4’s coverage formula and Section 5’s
preclearance requirement made the VRA particularly effective at addressing
the shortcomings of previous voting legislation.55 By requiring jurisdictions
with a history of de jure discrimination to seek federal approval of new voting
legislation, Section 4 and Section 5 worked in tandem to prevent states from
creating new practices that would discriminate against voters of color.56 In
this way, the VRA helped stop states from doing what they had done so many
times before: tweaking their laws to seemingly comply with federal decrees
but in fact continuing to disenfranchise citizens of color.57
By proactively preventing the passage of discriminatory laws, Sections
4 and 5 also reduced the need for litigation to eliminate individual state use
of a particular voting practice, a strategy that had proved ineffective in
previous years.58 When read alongside Sections 4 and 5, Section 2, which
allows voters to challenge voting practices after a state had already used
them, is best understood as a back-up option in the fight against voter
discrimination.59 Unlike Sections 4 and 5, Section 2 was not designed to
prevent discriminatory laws from going into effect.60 However, Section 2 at
51. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437-46 (codified as amended
at 52 U.S.C. § 10301).
52. In 1965, Section 4(b) covered jurisdictions that used a literacy test or device and that had
voter registration or turnout rates below 50% in the 1964 election. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(b).
53. States subject to Section 5’s preclearance requirement had to get voting legislation
approved by the Attorney General or by a panel of federal judges. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5.
54. Id.
55. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 560 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
56. Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 4(b), invalidated by Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529
(2013); Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5.
57. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
58. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
59. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2356 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing that “Congress never meant for Section 2 to bear all of the weight of the [VRA’s]
commitments”).
60. Plaintiffs who attempt to use Section 2 to secure relief against discriminatory voting laws
before such laws go into effect face an uphill battle. Christopher S. Elmendorf & Douglas M.
Spencer, Administering Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act After Shelby County, 115 COLUM. U. L.
REV. 2143, 2158 (2015) (noting that plaintiffs secure preliminary injunctions in about 5% of Section
2 cases).
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least gives voters another source from which to challenge such laws, rather
than relying primarily on the Fifteenth Amendment.61
2. Congress Repeatedly Reauthorized the VRA, Recognizing the
Need for Continued Voter Protections
Since its initial passage, Congress has reauthorized the VRA four
times.62 In 1970, Section 4’s coverage formula was extended to jurisdictions
that used a literacy test or device63 and that had less than 50% voter
registration or turnout in the 1968 election.64 The 1970 reauthorization also
banned literacy tests and devices nationwide.65
Five years later, Congress reauthorized the VRA again.66 The coverage
formula was once more extended, and the Act’s definition of “test or device”
was broadened to include the practice of providing English-only voting
materials in places where over 5% of the voting-age population spoke another
language.67 Additionally, Sections 2 and 5 were amended to prohibit voting
discrimination based on membership in a minority language group.68
In 1982, Congress reauthorized the VRA for twenty-five more years.69
This reauthorization introduced the “bailout” provision, in which a political
subdivision could seek exemption from Section 5’s preclearance
requirement.70 Congress also amended Section 2 to prohibit voting practices
that had the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote, in addition to
practices that had the purpose of vote denial or abridgement.71
The most recent VRA reauthorization came in 2006.72 Like the 1982
reauthorization, this reauthorization approved the statute for another twentyfive years and did not change Section 4’s coverage formula.73 This
reauthorization amended Section 5 to prohibit voting changes with “any
61. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 311–12 (1966) (listing cases in which
plaintiffs challenged voting practices under the Fifteenth Amendment).
62. See infra notes 63–74 and accompanying text.
63. Examples of a “device” included requirements that a person demonstrate “good moral
character” or have a registered voter vouch for their qualifications. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub.
L. No. 89-110, § 4(c), 79 Stat. 437-46 (codified as amended at 52 U.S.C. § 10303(c)).
64. Voting Rights Act of 1965, amended by Pub L. 91-285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970).
65. Id.
66. Voting Rights Act of 1965, amended by Pub L. 94-73, 89 Stat. 402 (1975).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Voting Rights Act of 1965, amended by Pub L. 97-205, 96 Stat. 134 (1982).
70. Id. A covered jurisdiction could seek a bailout if, in the last ten years, it had not used a
forbidden test or device, had not been denied preclearance, and had not lost a Section 2 lawsuit. Id.
71. Id.
72. Voting Rights Act of 1965, amended by Pub L. 109-246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006).
73. Id.
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discriminatory purpose” as well as changes that diminished the ability of
citizens “to elect their preferred candidates of choice” on account of race,
color, or language minority status.74
This reauthorization was
overwhelmingly popular with both major political parties: it passed 98-0 in
the Senate, and 390-33 in the House of Representatives.75
3. The VRA Reduced Voter Discrimination, but Persistent State
Attempts at Disenfranchisement Made Its Ongoing Protections
Necessary
The VRA was largely successful in addressing the blatant voter
discrimination and disenfranchisement that had plagued America since the
end of Reconstruction.76 In the five years after the VRA was passed, almost
as many Black voters registered to vote in six Southern states as had
registered in the entire century before 1965—an enormous improvement.77
Because Section 5’s preclearance requirement forced states to seek approval
before making changes, state legislatures were also prevented from enacting
other “vote denial schemes,” such as racially motivated redistricting plans.78
In this way, the VRA adapted as the forms of voter discrimination changed.79
Data from 2009 demonstrated the VRA’s effectiveness at preventing
voter discrimination.80 In its decision in Northwest Austin Municipal District
Number One v. Holder,81 the Supreme Court noted that “the racial gap in
voter registration and turnout is lower in the [s]tates originally covered by
[Section] 5 than it is nationwide.”82 Three years later, in the same decision
in which the Supreme Court declared Section 4’s coverage formula
unconstitutional, the Court acknowledged that the VRA had proved
“immensely successful” at reducing racial discrimination in voting.83

74. Id.
75. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 565 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
76. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2353 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Id. at 2353–54.
79. Id. at 2354. Another example of the VRA’s adaptability was the 1975 reauthorization’s
inclusion of language discrimination. Voting Rights Act of 1965, amended by Pub L. 94-73, 89
Stat. 402 (1975).
80. Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 201–02 (2009).
81. 557 U.S. 193 (2009).
82. Id. at 203–04. Instead of seeing this progress as a sign that the legislation was working as
intended, the Court viewed it as an indication that the “evil that [Section] 5 is meant to address may
no longer be concentrated in the jurisdictions singled out for preclearance.” Id. at 203.
83. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 548 (2013) (“There is no doubt that these
improvements are in large part because of the Voting Rights Act.”).
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But despite its successes, the VRA did not completely eliminate voter
discrimination.84 In the years leading up to the 2006 reauthorization, Section
5’s preclearance requirement was still being used to strike down state
legislation that targeted or burdened voters of color.85 When it reauthorized
the VRA in 2006, Congress acknowledged that the VRA was the “driving
force” behind the significant improvement in voting conditions in the
South.86 However, because the record showed that voter discrimination had
not disappeared but instead had evolved into “more subtle forms of voting
rights deprivations,” Congress determined that the VRA’s protections were
still necessary.87
B. Recent Supreme Court Decisions Have Significantly Eroded the
VRA
In the decades following the VRA’s passage, the Court consistently
preserved the VRA against constitutional attacks.88 However, beginning in
the 2000s, the Court began to question whether the VRA’s most stringent
protections remained necessary. 89 In Shelby County v. Holder, the Court
invalidated the VRA’s most effective provision, Section 4’s coverage
formula,90 and in Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee, the Court
created a new list of factors that will significantly change how lower courts
view challenges to voting laws under Section 2’s broad discrimination
provision.91
1. For the Majority of the VRA’s History, the Court Upheld the
VRA Against Constitutional Challenges
The first significant challenge to the VRA’s constitutionality came
immediately after its passage.92 In South Carolina v. Katzenbach,93 the Court
considered whether certain sections of the VRA were unconstitutional.94
South Carolina challenged several provisions of the VRA, particularly

84. Id. at 573 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
85. Id. at 573–75 (listing numerous examples of laws blocked by Section 5’s preclearance
requirement in the 1990s and 2000s).
86. Id. at 575.
87. Id. at 575–76.
88. See infra Section I.B.1.
89. See infra Section I.B.1.
90. See infra Section I.B.2.
91. See infra Section I.B.3. and Section II.A.1.
92. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 307 (1966).
93. 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
94. Id. at 307.
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Section 4’s coverage formula and Section 5’s preclearance requirement.95
South Carolina argued that in passing these sections, Congress had exceeded
its powers and encroached on an area reserved to the states by the
Constitution.96 South Carolina also asserted that Section 4’s coverage
formula violated the principle of “the equality of [s]tates.”97
The Court rejected South Carolina’s arguments, holding that Congress
was operating within its Fifteenth Amendment authority when it passed the
VRA.98 The Court added that the VRA was a “legitimate response”99 to the
voting discrimination that existed on a “pervasive scale,”100 despite previous
legislative attempts to eradicate it.101 The Court also explained that the
doctrine of equality of the states only applies to the terms on which states are
admitted to the country.102 As a result, it was irrelevant that the VRA did not
apply to all states.103
The Katzenbach Court used strong language to uphold the
constitutionality of the VRA.104 The Court acknowledged that the VRA was
an “uncommon exercise of congressional power” but contended that the
legislation was justified by “exceptional conditions.”105 Because Congress
knew that some states covered by the VRA had resorted to the “extraordinary
stratagem of contriving new rules . . . for the sole purpose of perpetuating
voting discrimination,” Congress had responded in a “permissibly decisive
manner.”106 In this way, the Katzenbach Court properly recognized that the
VRA was an appropriate exercise of Congress’s power to enforce the
Fifteenth Amendment and prevent racial discrimination in voting.107
Over the next few decades, the Court would continue to maintain the
constitutionality of the VRA.108 For example, in the 1973 case Georgia v.
95. Id. at 317.
96. Id. at 323.
97. Id. This doctrine requires states to be admitted to the country on “equal footing.” Coyle v.
Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 567 (1911).
98. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 325–27 (“[Section] 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment expressly
declares that ‘Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.’”).
99. Id. at 328.
100. Id. at 308.
101. Id. at 313.
102. Id. at 328–29.
103. Id. at 330–31.
104. Id. at 324 (“Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional
prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”) (emphasis added).
105. Id. at 334.
106. Id. at 335.
107. Id. at 325–26.
108. See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980) (holding that a city within a
state covered by Section 4’s coverage formula could not seek exemption from Section 5’s
preclearance requirement); Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266 (1998) (finding that Section 5’s
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United States,109 the Court upheld a decision to enjoin Georgia from
implementing a redistricting plan for the State’s House of Representatives.110
The Georgia legislature passed this plan without receiving preclearance as
required by Section 5.111 The Court found that this plan, which would have
decreased the number of multimember districts, had the potential to dilute the
value of votes cast by Black Georgians.112 As a result, the Court struck down
the plan.113
The 1986 case Thornburg v. Gingles presented the Court with its first
opportunity to construe Section 2’s broad prohibition of voting practices that
deny or abridge the right to vote.114 In 1982, North Carolina enacted a
legislative redistricting plan, and a group of Black North Carolinians alleged
that the plan impaired their ability to elect representatives of their choice in
several districts.115 After the lawsuit was filed, Congress amended Section 2
to clarify that violations did not require showing a “discriminatory purpose”
but rather only showing a “discriminatory effect.”116 The Senate also
identified a list of factors that might be “probative” of a Section 2 violation.117
These factors included the jurisdiction’s history of de facto discrimination
against voters in a minority group (Gingles factor one); the extent of racially
polarized voting in the jurisdiction (Gingles factor two); whether the effects
of past discrimination persist (Gingles factor five); and the extent to which
political campaigns in the jurisdiction have used racial appeals (Gingles
factor six).118 In a unanimous decision, the Gingles Court applied these
factors to North Carolina’s redistricting plan and found that the plan violated
Section 2 by diluting the power of Black votes in five of the six challenged
districts.119

preclearance requirement applies to all covered counties, even when the legislation is passed by a
non-covered state).
109. 411 U.S. 526 (1973).
110. Id. at 541.
111. Id. at 529–30.
112. Id. at 529–31; see also Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966) (explaining that
multimember districts are discriminatory when they “minimize or cancel out the voting strength of
racial [minorities]” (quoting Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965)).
113. 411 U.S. at 541.
114. 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986).
115. Id. at 35.
116. Id. (emphasis added).
117. Id. at 36. The Gingles Court referred to these factors as the “Senate Report factors.” Id. at
48–49 n.15. In this Comment, I refer to them as the Gingles factors to make comparison with the
Brnovich factors more clear.
118. Id. at 36–37.
119. Id. at 80.
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But the new millennium brought new doubts about whether the VRA’s
heavy hammer was still needed.120 In 2009, the Court began to question the
constitutionality of certain sections of the VRA.121 In Northwest Austin
Municipal District Number One v. Holder, the Court held that a utility district
responsible for running its own elections was eligible to seek a bailout under
Section 5, even though the district was not a “political subdivision” as
defined in the VRA.122 Although the Northwest Austin Court did not rule on
the VRA’s constitutionality, its discussion of the VRA’s preclearance
requirements and coverage formula foreshadowed the Court’s future
treatment of the VRA.123 Despite contending that its usual practice was to
“avoid the unnecessary resolution of constitutional questions,”124 the
Northwest Austin Court emphasized that the VRA “imposes current burdens
and must be justified by current needs.”125 It also asserted that any departure
from the “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” required showing that
Section 4’s coverage formula, which applied only to some jurisdictions, was
sufficiently related to the problem it targeted.126 The Court reached its
decision on statutory interpretation grounds but addressed the federalism and
equal sovereignty issues at length in dicta.127 In doing so, the Northwest
Austin decision reflected how much the Court’s view of the VRA had
changed.128
2. In Shelby County, the Supreme Court Gutted the VRA by
Invalidating Section 4’s Coverage Formula
Shelby County v. Holder stripped the VRA of its most powerful tool by
striking down Section 4’s coverage formula.129 The facts in Shelby County

120. See, e.g., Reno v. Bossier Par. Sch. Bd., 528 U.S. 320, 321 (2000) (finding that Section 5
does not prohibit preclearance of a redistricting plan that was enacted with a discriminatory but
nonretrogressive purpose); Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461, 479 (2003) (holding that a state’s
redistricting plan can diminish the effectiveness of minority votes without violating Section 5 if the
state can show that the “gains in the plan as a whole offset the loss in a particular district”).
121. Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 201–05 (2009).
122. Id. at 206–11.
123. Id. at 201–05 (discussing the “substantial ‘federalism costs’” of Section 5’s preclearance
requirement) (quoting Lopez v. Monterey Cnty., 525 U.S. 266, 282 (1999)).
124. Id. at 197.
125. Id. at 203.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 206–11.
128. Compare id. at 203 (“The Act also differentiates between the States, despite our historic
tradition that all the States enjoy ‘equal sovereignty.’”), with South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383
U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966) (“The doctrine of the equality of States . . . applies only to the terms upon
which States are admitted to the Union . . . .”).
129. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 557 (2013).
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mirrored those in Katzenbach.130 Shelby County, Alabama, sought a
declaratory judgment that Sections 4(b) and 5 of the VRA were facially
unconstitutional.131 The district court upheld the VRA, finding that the
evidence Congress used in the 2006 reauthorization was sufficient to justify
continued use of the challenged sections.132 The Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit affirmed the district court and accepted Congress’s conclusion
that Section 5’s preclearance requirement remained necessary.133
Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme Court concluded that Section
4’s coverage formula was unconstitutional because it was based on fortyyear-old facts and was not grounded in “current conditions.”134 In its
explanation, the Court echoed its reasoning in Northwest Austin by relying
heavily on the “‘fundamental principle of equal sovereignty’ among the
states”—the same principle that the Court found inapplicable in
Katzenbach.135 The Court found that Section 4’s coverage formula departed
from the equal sovereignty principle because it required only some
jurisdictions to get voting legislation precleared.136 And by declaring Section
4’s coverage formula unconstitutional, the Court also rendered Section 5’s
preclearance requirement useless.137 Without Section 4’s coverage formula,
Section 5 had no jurisdictions subject to preclearance.138
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg stressed that the Fifteenth
Amendment made it clear that whether and how to reauthorize the VRA was
for Congress, not the Court, to decide.139 Justice Ginsburg contended that the
Court should have deferred to Congress’s decision, especially because
Congress took the reauthorization process so seriously.140 The dissent also
addressed the majority’s assertion that the VRA was no longer needed
because voting discrimination in covered jurisdictions had decreased
130. Id. at 540–41; see supra notes 92–97 and accompanying text.
131. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 427 (D.D.C. 2011).
132. Id. at 492–98.
133. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 679 F.3d 838, 853, 865–73 (D.C. Cir. 2012). The Court of Appeals
also noted that the use of Section 2 litigation in covered jurisdictions was inadequate to protect the
rights of voters of color. Id. at 863–64.
134. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 553–54, 556.
135. Id. at 544 (“[A]s we made clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental principle of equal
sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of [s]tates.”).
136. Id. at 544–45.
137. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 5, 79 Stat. 437-46 (codified as amended
at 52 U.S.C. § 10304).
138. Id. (explaining that Section 5’s preclearance requirements apply to states covered by
Section 4(b)’s coverage formula).
139. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 566–567 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The Shelby County Court
split along ideological lines, with Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan joining Justice Ginsburg’s
dissent. Id. at 559.
140. Id. at 564–65.
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dramatically.141 In a now-famous line, Justice Ginsburg declared that
“[t]hrowing out preclearance when it has worked and is continuing to work
to stop discriminatory changes is like throwing away your umbrella in a
rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”142
3. In Brnovich, the Court Created a New Set of Factors to
Determine Whether a State’s Voting Laws Violate Section 2
With Section 4 invalidated and Section 5 rendered moot, the burden to
prevent discrimination shifted to Section 2.143 Section 2 prohibits voting
practices or standards that have the effect of denying or abridging the right to
vote on account of race.144 In Brnovich v. Democratic National Committee,
the Court created a new standard for evaluating Section 2 claims.145
At issue in Brnovich were two Arizona statutes: one preventing out-ofprecinct ballots from being cast (the “out-of-precinct rule”), and another
forbidding the collection of early mail-in ballots by third-party groups (“HB
2023”).146 The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona found that the
out-of-precinct rule did not have a “meaningfully disparate impact” on voters
of color and thus did not violate Section 2.147 The district court also upheld
HB 2023, finding that it was unlikely to “cause a meaningful inequality in
the electoral opportunities of minorities” because the rule applied to all voters
and did not impose burdens beyond those normally associated with voting.148
Finally, the district court found that HB 2023 was not enacted with
discriminatory intent because the majority of the bill’s proponents were
“sincere in their belief” that Arizona needed stronger ballot collection
restrictions to prevent fraud.149
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court,
finding that both the out-of-precinct rule and HB 2023 imposed disparate

141. Id. at 571 (explaining that Congress reauthorized the VRA in part because “there were more
DOJ objections [to proposed legislation] between 1982 and 2004 (626) than there were between
1965 and [1982] (490)”).
142. Id. at 590.
143. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2356 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
144. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, § 2, 79 Stat. 437-46 (codified as amended
at 52 U.S.C. § 1301).
145. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2338–40.
146. Id. at 2334; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-1005(H)–(I) (2016) (criminalizing the
collection of absentee ballots by anyone besides a postal worker, an elections official, or the voter’s
caregiver, family member, or household member); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-122 (2015)
(requiring a person’s name to appear in precinct registers to be able to vote in that precinct).
147. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d 824, 872, 878 (D. Ariz. 2018).
148. Id. at 845, 871.
149. Id. at 879–80.
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impacts on voters of color in violation of Section 2.150 The Ninth Circuit also
held that the district court “clearly erred” when it held that HB 2023 was not
enacted with discriminatory intent.151
In a 6-3 decision, the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and
found that the Arizona rules did not violate Section 2 because the laws did
not prevent Arizona’s political process from being “equally open” to voters
of color.152 The Court also held that HB 2023 was not enacted with
discriminatory intent.153 Writing for the majority, Justice Alito explained that
the totality of the circumstances showed that neither Arizona law went
beyond the ‘“usual burdens’ of voting.”154 The Court also found that the
prevention of voter fraud was a “strong and entirely legitimate” state interest
that could justify voting laws which might have a disparate impact on voters
of color, despite no evidence of voter fraud in Arizona being presented.155
Brnovich was notable because the Court chose not to apply the factors
it utilized in Gingles.156 The Gingles factors had long been applied to Section
2 cases.157 But instead of following this Section 2 precedent, the Brnovich
majority created a new set of factors to determine whether a voting law
violates Section 2.158 The Court explained that this “fresh look” was
appropriate because Gingles dealt with a redistricting plan, while Brnovich
dealt with what the majority described as “time, place, or manner” of voting
rules.159
The first Brnovich factor is the size of the burden imposed by the voting
rule.160
Because voting naturally involves some burdens, “[m]ere
inconvenience” does not demonstrate a Section 2 violation.161 The second
factor is the degree to which a voting rule departs from the voting practices

150. Democratic Nat’l. Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F. 3d 989, 1032, 1037 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
151. Id. at 1041.
152. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2337, 2343–44 (2021).
153. Id. at 2350.
154. Id. at 2344 (citing Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election. Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 198 (2008)).
155. Id. at 2340.
156. Id. at 2337; see supra notes 117–119 and accompanying text.
157. See, e.g., Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); Voinovich v. Quilter, 507 U.S. 146
(1993); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994).
158. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2338–40. The Gingles factors focused more directly on racial
discrimination in voting, such as the history of voting-related discrimination in the state. Gingles,
478 U.S. at 44–45; see supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text. The Brnovich factors focus
less on discrimination and more on balancing the burdens of a voting rule against the other voting
opportunities that exist. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2338–40.
159. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2337.
160. Id. at 2338.
161. Id. (providing examples of burdens associated with voting, such as time spent traveling to
a polling place).

1280

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:1265

commonly used in 1982.162 The Court explained that those practices would
be a “useful” benchmark when comparing the burdens imposed by a
challenged rule.163 The third factor is the size of the disparities imposed by
a rule on different minority groups.164 The smaller the disparity, the more
likely it is that the voting process is equally open.165 The fourth factor is
whether there are other voting opportunities provided by the state’s election
system, which requires courts to evaluate a law’s burden alongside other
methods of voting.166 The final factor is the strength of the state interest
served by the voting rule.167 When the state interest served by the rule is
strong, the rule is less likely to violate Section 2.168
In dissent, Justice Kagan contended that the majority’s creation of new
factors undermined Section 2 and incorrectly interpreted the VRA.169 Justice
Kagan asserted that the majority rested its decision on a list of “mostly madeup factors” that ignore both the statutory text and the legislative intent of
Section 2.170 The dissent also emphasized that preserving the broad
protections of Section 2 “matters more than ever” because after Shelby
County decimated the protections of Sections 4 and 5, Section 2 “is what
voters have left.”171
C. States Previously Subject to VRA Preclearance Resume Passing
Restrictive Voting Laws
For decades, Section 4’s coverage formula and Section 5’s preclearance
requirement worked together to prevent states from discriminating against
voters of color.172 However, after Shelby County, states were once again free
to pass legislation making it harder for certain groups of voters to cast a

162. Id. at 2338–39 (listing state laws in 1982 that required “nearly all voters” to vote in person
on Election Day and that restricted absentee ballots to “only narrow and tightly defined categories
of voters”).
163. Id.
164. Id. at 2339.
165. Id.
166. Id. (explaining that this factor stems from Section 2’s reference to a state’s ‘“political
process’ as a whole”).
167. Id. at 2339–40.
168. Id. at 2340.
169. Id. at 2351 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
170. Id. at 2362; id. at 2356 (emphasizing that Congress “meant to eliminate all ‘discriminatory
election systems or practices’” and asserting that the Court should “read [Section 2] as Congress
wrote it”).
171. Id. at 2356.
172. See Nw. Austin Mun. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 201 (2009) (“The historic
accomplishments of the [VRA] are undeniable.”).
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ballot.173 Many states wasted no time in doing so.174 For example,
immediately after Shelby County was decided, Texas announced that it would
implement a strict voter ID law that had previously been blocked by Section
5’s preclearance requirement.175 Other states enacted redistricting plans
“guaranteed to reduce minority representation” and closed polling places in
minority neighborhoods.176 These significant changes in voting legislation
reinstated practices that likely would have been prevented by the VRA’s
preclearance requirement.177
1. Georgia and Texas Pass Severely Restrictive Voting Laws
Almost ten years after Shelby County was decided, the barrage of
restrictive voting legislation at the state level has not slowed down.178
Georgia and Texas, two states previously covered by the VRA, passed even
stricter voting laws after the 2020 election.179
In March 2021, the Georgia legislature passed Senate Bill 202 (“SB
202”).180 This law made significant changes to Georgia elections, including
(1) shortening the amount of time voters have to request absentee ballots;181
(2) banning election officials from mailing absentee ballot applications to
voters;182 and (3) prohibiting the distribution of food or water to voters
waiting at polling places.183 However, SB 202 does not stop at pre-election
changes.184 It also made changes to the State Election Board, which oversees

173. See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2355 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (detailing state efforts to enact
restrictive voting legislation).
174. Id. at 10.
175. Id.; see also N.C. State Conf. of NAACP v. McCrory, 831 F.3d 204, 214 (4th Cir. 2016)
(striking down proposed legislation because it “target[ed] African Americans with almost surgical
precision”).
176. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2355–56 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
177. Id. at 2356 (noting that some new voting laws may contain lawful restrictions, but “chances
are that some have the kind of impact the [VRA] was designed to prevent”).
178. Voting Laws Roundup: December 2021, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Jan. 12, 2022),
https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/research-reports/voting-laws-roundup-december-2021.
179. Jurisdictions Previously Covered by Section 5, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/jurisdictions-previously-covered-section-5. Both states have also been
involved in numerous VRA lawsuits. See supra notes 108–113, 121–128 and accompanying text;
see also League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 440 (2006) (holding that
Texas’s attempt to redraw a congressional district to reduce the strength of Latino voters bore “the
mark of intentional discrimination” and ordering the district redrawn).
180. 2021 Ga. Laws 14 (SB 202).
181. Id. § 25(a)(1)(A).
182. Id. § 25(a)(1)(C)(ii).
183. Id. § 33(a).
184. Id.
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election administration.185 Under SB 202, the Republican-controlled Georgia
legislature gained more control over the State Election Board and has the
power to suspend county election officials.186
In September 2021, the Texas legislature enacted Senate Bill 1 (“SB
1”).187 This law made sweeping changes to the state’s voting processes and
took particular aim at practices used by diverse metropolitan areas in the 2020
election.188 Among other restrictions, SB 1 bans drive-thru voting189 and 24hour early voting periods;190 forbids election officials from sending
applications to request an absentee ballot;191 and imposes new identification
requirements on absentee ballots.192 The law also includes a process for
purging voters from voter rolls.193 Like the provisions in Georgia’s SB 202,
the changes in Texas’s SB 1 would have been subject to Section 5’s
preclearance requirement and likely would have been prevented from going
into effect.194
In June 2021, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) filed a lawsuit against
Georgia, alleging that portions of SB 202 were racially discriminatory in
violation of Section 2.195 The DOJ challenged the changes made to absentee
ballot requirements, noting that nearly 30% of Black Georgians voted by mail
in 2020, compared to 24% of white voters.196 The DOJ also challenged the
prohibition on food and water distribution at polling places, emphasizing that
this provision would disproportionately harm Black voters.197 In November
2021, the DOJ filed a lawsuit against Texas challenging SB 1.198 In its
complaint, the DOJ asserted that certain provisions of SB 1 will make it
harder for “vulnerable voters” to cast a ballot.199 In filing these lawsuits, the
185. Id. § 6.
186. Id.
187. 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (SB 1).
188. Nick Corasaniti, Texas Senate Passes One of the Nation’s Strictest Voting Bills, N.Y. TIMES
(May 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/29/us/politics/texas-voting-bill.html.
189. 2021 Tex. Gen. Laws 1 (SB 1) § 3.04.
190. Id. § 3.09(c).
191. Id. § 5.04.
192. Id. § 5.02(a).
193. Id. § 2.05.
194. U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., supra note 179.
195. Complaint at 1–3, United States v. Georgia, No. 1:21-cv-02575-JPB (N.D. Ga. June 25,
2021).
196. Id. at 7.
197. Id. at 20. Approximately two-thirds of the polling places that had to stay open late because
of long lines during the June 2020 primary election were in majority-Black neighborhoods. Id.
198. Complaint at 1–2, United States v. Texas, No. 5:21-cv-01085 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 4, 2021).
199. Id. The DOJ challenged SB 1 under the VRA’s requirement of aiding voters who are blind,
disabled, or illiterate. Id. at 1. The complaint specifically names voters with limited English
proficiency, elderly voters, and disabled voters as among those most impacted by the law. Id. It is
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federal government found itself back at square one: attacking individual
instances of voter discrimination after they happen, instead of preventing
discrimination before voters of color are disenfranchised.200
2. Proposed Federal Legislation Aims to Restore and Update the
VRA
With the VRA’s once-mighty powers nearly extinguished, new
legislation has been proposed to address the resurgence of restrictive voting
laws. At the time of this writing, three bills have been introduced in Congress
to restore federal voting rights protections. The first, the For the People Act
(“HR 1”),201 would tackle a range of issues from voter registration to
campaign finance. Among other things, HR 1 would require that provisional
ballots from eligible voters at incorrect polling places be counted and would
prohibit states from imposing restrictions on a voter’s ability to vote by
mail.202
The second bill is the John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act (“HR
203
4”).
This bill focuses on restoring and updating VRA protections.204 HR
4 would create a new coverage formula that would apply to all states.205
Under HR 4, states that have had repeated voting rights violations in the past
twenty-five years would be subject to preclearance.206 Additionally, the
twenty-five-year preclearance period would move continuously: A covered
state’s voting practices would be evaluated each year, ensuring that the
coverage formula is always aligned to current conditions.207
The final proposed legislation is the Freedom to Vote Act (“S. 2747”).208
This bill seeks to nationalize many of the voting procedures that have been
limited in states with Republican leadership, such as early voting and voting
by mail.209 The Freedom to Vote Act would prohibit states from imposing

not clear why the DOJ chose not to challenge the Texas law under Section 2 like it did in the Georgia
lawsuit. However, it is worth noting that the Georgia lawsuit was brought before Brnovich created
a new list of Section 2 factors, while the Texas lawsuit was brought after. See infra Section II.B.2.
200. See supra notes 44–48 and accompanying text.
201. See generally For the People Act, H.R. 1, 117th Cong. (2021).
202. H.R. 1, tit. 1, §§ 1601, 1621.
203. See generally John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, H.R. 4, 117th Cong. (2021).
204. See generally id.
205. Id. § 5.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. See generally Freedom to Vote Act, S. 2747, 117th Cong. (2021).
209. S. 2747 §§ 1201, 1301–05.
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burdens on absentee ballots and would address some of the election
administration restrictions that states like Georgia have signed into law.210
II. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court’s most recent voting rights decision, Brnovich v.
Democratic National Committee, weakens the right to vote in America even
further. First, by improperly departing from its precedent in other VRA
cases, the Brnovich Court failed to uphold even the meager protections that
voters have left under Section 2.211 Second, by listing the prevention of voter
fraud as a “strong and entirely legitimate” state interest, the Court gave states
a blueprint for passing restrictive voting legislation.212
A. The Court’s Approach in Brnovich Defied its VRA Precedent
By failing to apply the Gingles factors, which had governed Section 2
claims for over twenty years, the Brnovich Court eroded what few VRA
protections remain.213 The Court’s new factors for Section 2 cases will make
it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed when challenging potentially
discriminatory voting laws.214 Additionally, by disregarding the “current
conditions” precedent established in Shelby County, the Court once again
indicated that it has no interest in upholding the VRA and protecting
vulnerable voters.215
1. The Brnovich Court Improperly Ignored the Gingles Factors
that Govern Section 2 Claims
In Thornburg v. Gingles, the Court established that the “essence” of a
Section 2 claim is that the challenged voting practice “interacts with social
and historical conditions to cause an inequality in the opportunities” voters
have to elect their preferred representatives.216 Under Gingles, a plaintiff
bringing a Section 2 lawsuit had to prove two things: (1) that the challenged
law had a racially disparate impact, and (2) that the impact could be linked to

210. S. 2747 §§ 3001, 3101–02; see supra Section I.C.1. For example, the Act would increase
protections for local election administrators to prevent them from being removed for partisan
reasons. S. 2747 § 3001.
211. See infra Section II.A.
212. See infra Section II.B.
213. See infra Section II.A.1.
214. See infra Section II.A.1.
215. See infra Section II.A.2.
216. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 47 (1986).
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social and historical conditions.217 The Gingles factors, which have been
consistently applied to Section 2 cases, allow courts to evaluate the
challenged voting law’s impact in light of a state’s history of discrimination
or the current landscape of racial discrimination or polarization.218
Although Gingles addressed vote dilution,219 lower courts have used its
factors as guidance in other types of Section 2 cases, such as vote denial
cases.220 However, the Brnovich Court improperly ignored the Gingles
factors and instead decided to create its own list of factors.221 The Court did
this under the guise of distinguishing Brnovich from vote dilution cases like
Gingles.222 The majority asserted that some of the Gingles factors were
“plainly inapplicable” to a case that does not address vote dilution.223 While
this may be true, Justice Alito understated the extent to which many of the
Gingles factors can and should apply to a case like Brnovich.224 Indeed, the
Gingles Court itself acknowledged that the factors it relied on were not
designed specifically for vote dilution claims, but instead were factors
“which typically may be relevant to a [Section] 2 claim.”225
The Brnovich Court identified only two Gingles factors as relevant to
the challenged Arizona laws: whether minority groups have suffered past
discrimination (Gingles factor one) and whether the effects of that
discrimination persist (Gingles factor five).226 But a closer look at Gingles
reveals that more of its factors could be relevant to a Section 2 vote denial

217. See, e.g., Veasey v. Abbott, 796 F.3d 487 (5th Cir. 2015) (applying the Gingles factors to
Texas’s voter ID law); League of Women Voters of N.C. v. North Carolina, 769 F.3d 224 (4th Cir.
2014) (applying the Gingles factors to North Carolina legislation that shortened early voting and
barred out-of-precinct ballots from being counted).
218. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
219. Vote dilution is the practice of sprinkling voters of color into majority-white districts in a
way that weakens the ability of voters of color to elect their preferred representative or win an
election. It is premised on the pattern that white voters and voters of color usually prefer different
candidates. See generally Heather K. Gerken, Understanding the Right to an Undiluted Vote, 114
HARV. L. REV. 1663 (2001) (explaining that vote dilution claims are often raised under Section 2).
220. See supra note 217. Although the majority refers to Brnovich as involving “facially neutral
time, place, or manner voting rule[s],” Brnovich is more accurately described as a “vote denial”
case. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2340 (2021). Vote denial occurs
when states pass laws to make voting harder. Daniel P. Tokaji, Applying Section 2 to the New Vote
Denial, 50 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 439, 439–40 (2015). Modern examples of vote denial include
laws that prohibit the counting of provisional ballots cast in the wrong precinct and that limit early
and absentee voting. Id. at 440.
221. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2338–40.
222. Id. at 2337, 2340.
223. Id. at 2340.
224. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44–45 (1986).
225. Id. at 44.
226. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2340.
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case like Brnovich.227 For example, the extent to which voting in the state is
racially polarized (Gingles factor two) and the use of overt or subtle racial
appeals in political campaigns (Gingles factor six) can be useful when
evaluating a Section 2 vote denial claim.228 The Ninth Circuit properly
followed precedent by using the Gingles factors to evaluate the Arizona
legislation.229 In finding that the Arizona laws violated Section 2, the Ninth
Circuit pointed to racial campaign appeals, racially polarized voting, current
socioeconomic disparities between racial groups, and Arizona’s long history
of racial discrimination, all of which were Gingles factors.230
The Supreme Court erred when it overturned the Ninth Circuit and
created a new set of Section 2 factors, but it did not stop at ignoring Gingles
precedent.231 The Court also failed to consider the few Gingles factors it
listed as relevant to the challenged Arizona laws.232 Even though the
Brnovich Court acknowledged that Gingles factors one and five (addressing
past discrimination and current effects of discrimination) should not be
“disregarded,” the majority proceeded to do just that.233 In evaluating the
Arizona legislation, the Court only used its newly created factors and did not
attempt to consider the Gingles factors it had recognized as being potentially
relevant.234 This omission suggests that the Court did not distinguish
Brnovich from Gingles solely because Brnovich was not a vote dilution
case.235 Instead, the Court emphasized the distinction between vote dilution
and vote denial cases in order to create new Section 2 factors “out of thin
air.”236 Furthermore, the factors the Court invented “all cut in one direction—
toward limiting liability for race-based voting inequalities,” which makes its
error more obvious.237

227. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 44–45; see supra note 220.
228. See infra notes 229–230 and accompanying text.
229. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Hobbs, 948 F.3d 989, 1016–32 (9th Cir. 2020) (en banc).
230. Id. at 1019–32.
231. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2337.
232. See supra notes 226–231 and accompanying text.
233. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2340.
234. Id. at 2343–46.
235. Id. at 2337.
236. Strict Scrutiny, Textually Challenged, CROOKED MEDIA, at 03:59 (July 6, 2021),
https://strictscrutinypodcast.com/podcast/textually/.
237. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2362 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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2. The Brnovich Court Went Against Its Own “Current
Conditions” Precedent Established in Shelby County
In addition to ignoring the Gingles factors, the Court also disregarded
the flawed precedent it created in Shelby County.238 The Brnovich Court’s
application of its newly created factors upheld Arizona’s voting legislation
that was purportedly designed to prevent fraud without requiring Arizona to
provide any evidence of fraud.239 However, in Shelby County, the Court
struck down Congress’s decision to reauthorize the VRA because the
decision was not grounded in “current conditions.”240 In the Court’s view,
the use of outdated data in Section 4’s coverage formula—even if voter
discrimination still existed—was enough to justify gutting a statute that had
been reauthorized by an overwhelming majority of Congress.241
In Brnovich, the Court reversed course completely. The Court’s
abandonment of the VRA was unreasonable in Shelby County, but its
abandonment of its “current conditions” precedent a mere eight years after it
was established is even more unreasonable. In a far cry from Shelby County’s
fixation on current data, the Brnovich Court did not bat an eye at Arizona’s
lack of evidence of voter fraud.242 Instead, the majority reasoned that “it
should go without saying that a [s]tate may take action to prevent election
fraud without waiting for it to occur and be detected within its own
borders.”243
But current evidence that a law is needed is precisely what the Court
required in Shelby County.244 There, the Court second-guessed Congress’s
judgment in reauthorizing the VRA and declared that because the racial gaps
in voter registration and turnout had closed significantly, the legislation was
no longer needed.245 In Brnovich, which also addressed a legislative decision,
the once-urgent need for current data suddenly disappeared.246 The Court

238. To be clear, the Shelby County Court erred by overturning Section 4 because it improperly
usurped Congressional authority. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 566–67 (2013) (Ginsburg,
J., dissenting). The Fifteenth Amendment grants Congress—not the Court—the power to decide
whether the VRA’s protections were still warranted, and Congress’s decision was due more
deference than the Court gave it. Id.
239. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2335, 2349; id. at 2371 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
240. See supra Section I.B.2.
241. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 536 (acknowledging that “voting discrimination still exists; no
one doubts that”); see supra text accompanying note 75.
242. Democratic Nat’l Comm. v. Reagan, 329 F. Supp. 3d 824, 852 (D. Ariz. 2018) (“[T]here
has never been a case of voter fraud associated with ballot collection charged in Arizona.”).
243. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2348.
244. Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 553–54.
245. Id. at 559 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
246. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2348.
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asserted that voter fraud “has had serious consequences in other [s]tates”247
and declared—without any proof to back up its claim—that “[f]raud is a real
risk that accompanies mail-in voting even if Arizona had the good fortune to
avoid it.”248 To make matters worse, the Brnovich Court did not even limit
its voter fraud factor to legislation involving absentee ballots, the method of
voting that Arizona legislators were allegedly worried about when they
passed HB 2023.249 Instead, the voter fraud factor applies to all legislation
challenged under Section 2, which will only make it harder for restrictive
laws to be struck down.250
The Brnovich Court ignored its Shelby County precedent in another
way: by creating a factor that asks courts to consider the degree to which the
challenged law departs from standard voting practices in 1982.251 In Shelby
County, the Court rejected the standards that existed in 1965 (which Congress
used to pass and then repeatedly reauthorize the VRA) because they led to a
coverage formula “based on decades-old data and eradicated practices.”252
The Court found that 1965 had “no logical relation to the present day” and
thus could not justify upholding the challenged sections of the VRA.253 But
in Brnovich, the Court embraced the use of nearly forty-year-old practices,
arguing that the burdens associated with the voting rules used in 1982 are
“useful in gauging whether the burdens imposed by a challenged rule are
sufficient to prevent voting from being equally ‘open’ . . . in the sense meant

247. Id. The only example of fraud the Court provides is a 2018 incident in North Carolina in
which a Republican political operative organized an operation to illegally complete absentee ballots.
Elaine Kamarck & Christine Stenglein, Low Rates of Fraud in Vote-by-Mail States Show the
Benefits
Outweigh
the
Risks,
BROOKINGS
(June
2,
2020),
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/02/low-rates-of-fraud-in-vote-by-mail-statesshow-the-benefits-outweigh-the-risks/. This type of fraud is more accurately described as election
fraud because it was an organized attempt to interfere with an election and did not involve individual
voters attempting to vote twice. Michael Blitzer, Three Lessons from North Carolina’s Tainted
Election—And
What
Comes
Next,
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
25,
2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/02/25/three-lessons-north-carolinas-taintedelection-what-comes-next/ (noting that the “extraordinary attention” paid to voter fraud meant that
not enough attention was paid to election fraud, “a more dangerous and prevalent type of election
malfeasance”).
248. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2348. Based on the evidence available, it is likely that the lack of
voter fraud in Arizona was not because of “good fortune,” but because almost no voter fraud occurs.
See infra notes 271–281 and accompanying text; see supra note 242.
249. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2335 (noting that some members of the Arizona legislature thought
HB 2023 was necessary to bring “early mail ballot security in line with in-person voting”).
250. Id. at 2337–40 (creating new factors for “time, place, or manner” voting laws).
251. Id. at 2338. The Court viewed 1982 as relevant because that was the last time Congress
amended Section 2. Id. at 2332.
252. Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 551 (2013).
253. Id. at 554.
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by [Section] 2.”254 In this way, the Court’s approach to voting rights cases
becomes even more clear—it will find a way to erode the voting protections
that Congress put in place, even if the reasoning it uses to do so is
inconsistent.
It is true that although Shelby County and Brnovich both addressed a
legislative decision, the cases are not directly analogous. Both Congress and
state legislatures have authority over certain parts of the election process, but
their powers derive from different parts of the Constitution.255 Congress’s
ability to pass the VRA derived from the Fifteenth Amendment, while states
reserve authority over their elections through the Tenth Amendment and
Article 1.256 But the Fifteenth Amendment, which was passed in part to
prevent states from denying the right to vote, arguably returns some of that
authority to Congress.257 As a result, the Court should be more skeptical of
challenges to the VRA, which is explicitly within Congress’s purview, and
examine the motivations behind state voting laws more carefully.258
B. The Court’s Creation of a Voter Fraud Factor Allows States to
Evade Section 2’s Prohibition of Discriminatory Voting Practices
By creating a voter fraud factor, the Court signaled to states that
potentially discriminatory legislation will be immune to Section 2 challenges
as long as the state alleges that the law is needed to prevent voter fraud.259
The Court’s creation of this voter fraud factor is concerning for two reasons.
First, because all evidence available shows that voter fraud is incredibly rare
in American elections,260 and second, because it suggests that the
conservative members of the Court have bought into, and are willing to
perpetuate, the patently false talking points of the Republican Party.261

254. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2338–39.
255. Compare U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (granting state legislatures the power to determine
the time, place, and manner of elections, with some exceptions), with U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2
(granting Congress the authority to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment’s prohibition of vote denial
or abridgement).
256. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2; id. amend. X; id. art. 1, § 4, cl. 1.
257. Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Race, Federalism, and Voting Rights, 2015
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 113, 135–36 (2015) (“The Court’s decision in Shelby County . . . rests on the
assumption that the Reconstruction Amendments did not change our understanding of ‘our
federalism’ in any meaningful way.”).
258. Joshua A. Douglas, (Mis)trusting States to Run Elections, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 553, 554
(2015) (noting that the Court has “accepted almost any assertion of a state interest to protect the
integrity of the election” but applies a much higher level of scrutiny to Congress’s justifications of
its voting laws).
259. See infra Section II.B.
260. See infra Section II.B.1.
261. See infra Section II.B.2.
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1. The Court’s Discussion of Voter Fraud Ignores the WellDocumented Reality that Voter Fraud Does Not Impact
American Elections
Brnovich was not the first decision in which the Court raised the issue
of voter fraud.262 In Purcell v. Gonzalez,263 the Court improperly inflated the
threat of voter fraud, opining that “[v]oter fraud drives honest citizens out of
the democratic process and breeds distrust of our government.”264 The Court
went on to theorize that “[v]oters who fear their legitimate votes will be
outweighed by fraudulent ones will feel disenfranchised.”265 Two years later,
in Crawford v. Marion County Election Board,266 the Court upheld an Indiana
voter identification law despite a lack of evidence of any voter fraud
occurring at any point in the state’s history.267 But the Brnovich Court takes
this voter fraud acknowledgement several steps further. By listing the
prevention of voter fraud as a “strong and legitimate” state interest—even
though there is no evidence that voter fraud impacts American elections—
the Brnovich Court gave states a blueprint for how to evade what few VRA
protections remain.268
In Brnovich, the majority offered little explanation for why voter fraud
is a strong enough threat to justify restrictive and potentially discriminatory
laws.269 The Court stated that fraud can “affect the outcome of a close
election;” asserted that “fraudulent votes dilute the right of citizens to cast
ballots that carry appropriate weight;” and contended that fraud can
undermine “public confidence” in election fairness and the “perceived
legitimacy” of an election’s outcome.270 Notably, the majority did not
include any proof to back up these claims—probably because voter fraud is

262. See infra notes 263–267 and accompanying text.
263. 549 U.S. 1 (2006).
264. Id. at 4.
265. Id. (emphasis added). The Court did not address the fact that feeling disenfranchised and
being disenfranchised are two entirely different things.
266. 553 U.S. 181 (2008).
267. Id. at 204; id. at 226 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
268. See infra notes 287–290, 298–304 and accompanying text; see also Rick Hasen, The
Supreme Court’s Latest Voting Rights Opinion Is Even Worse than It Seems, SLATE (July 8, 2021),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2021/07/supreme-court-sam-alito-brnovich-angry.html
(explaining the likely consequences of the Brnovich ruling).
269. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2340 (2021).
270. Id.
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virtually nonexistent, which makes evidence hard to find.271 Additionally,
Arizona did not provide any evidence of voter fraud occurring in the state.272
The Brnovich Court’s discussion of fraud is deeply concerning precisely
because there is no data to support the allegation that voter fraud impacts
American elections in any way.273 Studies, including those done by
conservative organizations such as the Heritage Foundation, repeatedly show
that voter fraud is extremely rare.274 The term “voter fraud” is generally
understood to mean voter impersonation fraud, in which a voter pretends to
be someone else to cast another ballot.275 Far from being a legitimate threat
to our elections, voter fraud is “exceedingly rare.”276 For example, of the 3.3
million votes cast in Wisconsin in the 2020 election, only twenty-seven were
found to be potentially fraudulent.277 The statistics are similar for absentee
271. Voter fraud simply does not occur frequently enough to have any impact on American
elections. See, e.g., A Sampling of Recent Election Fraud Cases from Across the United States,
HERITAGE FOUND. (2021), https://www.heritage.org/voterfraud (finding that of the 250 million
absentee ballots cast over the past twenty years, just 143 ballots led to a criminal conviction because
of fraud); John S. Ahlquist et al., Alien Abduction and Voter Impersonation in the 2012 U.S. General
Election: Evidence from a Survey List Experiment, 13 ELECTION L.J. 460, 460 (2014) (finding no
evidence of widespread voter fraud, even in states that did not have voter identification laws);
Sharad Goel et al., One Person, One Vote: Examining the Prevalence of Double Voting in U.S.
Presidential Elections, 114 AM. POLI. SCI. R. 456, 467 (2020) (finding that the same person voting
twice is not carried out in a way that “presents a threat” to American elections); David Cottrell et
al., An Exploration of Donald Trump’s Allegations of Massive Voter Fraud in the 2016 General
Election, 51 ELECTORAL STUD. 123, 123 (2018) (finding no data to support Trump’s assertions of
“systematic voter fraud”).
272. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2371 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Arizona has not offered any evidence
of fraud in ballot collection, or even an account of a harm threatening to happen.”).
273. Brief for Maxwell V. Pritt as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents at 6, Brnovich v.
Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321 (2021) [hereinafter Brief for Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents] (“There is an overwhelming consensus among political scientists that voter fraud in
contemporary U.S. elections is rare.”).
274. See supra note 271.
275. Lynn Adelman, A New Stage in the Struggle for Voting Rights, 43 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK
L. REV. 477, 480–81 (2021); see also Jocelyn Friedrichs Benson, Voter Fraud or Voter Defrauded?
Highlighting an Inconsistent Consideration of Election Fraud, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6
(2009) (explaining that “voter-initiated fraud” includes voting multiple times or impersonating a
voter).
276. Brief for Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 273, at 3. States already have
harsh punishments in place for voters who commit fraud. MICHAEL WALDMAN, THE FIGHT TO
VOTE 183 (2016). For example, in Wisconsin, voter fraud is punishable by a $10,000 fine and three
years in prison. Id.
277. A potentially fraudulent ballot is a ballot that has not been proven to be fraudulent, but that
gives investigators reasons to be suspicious. Scott Bauer, 27 Possible Voter Fraud Cases in 3
Million Wisconsin Ballots, AP NEWS (May 21, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/1291onmoutrump-wisconsin-election-2020-government-and-politics-daa3ac227c936d7fc038996af6e27cbe;
Elise Viebeck, Miniscule Number of Potentially Fraudulent Ballots in States with Universal Mail
Voting Undercuts Trump Claims about Election Risks, WASH. POST (June 8, 2020),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/minuscule-number-of-potentially-fraudulent-ballots-in-
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voting, a voting method at issue in Brnovich.278 For example, in Oregon—
which conducts its elections entirely by mail—only fourteen of the 15.5
million ballots cast between 2000 and 2019 were found to be fraudulent.279
These are hardly the kinds of numbers that indicate that voter fraud is a threat
urgent enough to make a state’s interest in preventing it “strong and entirely
legitimate.”280 By listing the prevention of voter fraud as a state interest, the
Brnovich Court created a factor that is not based on reality, but on an
incredibly rare possibility.281
While voter fraud does not impact the outcome of elections, it certainly
impacts public opinion.282 As allegations of voter fraud have increased with
each passing election cycle, a growing percentage of Americans have started
to believe that voter fraud is a pressing problem.283 A Monmouth University
poll from June 2021 found that 37% of Americans view voter fraud as a
“major problem.”284 While this figure has increased by only one percentage
point since 2012, the percentage of Republicans who see voter fraud as a
major problem has grown from 51% in 2012 to 64% in 2021.285 This increase
suggests that the constant roar within the Republican Party about the
nonexistent threat of voter fraud has “made [voter fraud] seem to be a real
problem.”286
2. The Creation of a Voter Fraud Factor Gives States a Blueprint
for How to Pass Restrictive Voting Legislation
In listing the prevention of voter fraud as a state interest that can justify
passing restrictive voting legislation, the Court made it easier for states to
circumvent what little VRA oversight remains.287 If a state passes legislation
states-with-universal-mail-voting-undercuts-trump-claims-about-electionrisks/2020/06/08/1e78aa26-a5c5-11ea-bb20-ebf0921f3bbd_story.html.
278. See supra note 271.
279. Kamarck, supra note 247. This means that less than one ballot per year was fraudulent. Id.
280. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2340 (2021).
281. See supra note 271.
282. Brief for Amici Curiae Supporting Respondents, supra note 273, at 4 (“[A]llegations of
voter fraud are not evidence of fraud. Allegations do, however, affect public opinion.”).
283. Margaret Groarke, The Impact of Voter Fraud Claims on Voter Registration Reform
Legislation, 131 POL. SCI. Q. 571, 571 (2016) (“In recent years, concerns about voter fraud have
grown louder. . . . Is there a sudden epidemic of fraud? No.”).
284. Patrick Murray, National: Public Supports Both Early Voting and Requiring Photo ID to
Vote, MONMOUTH UNIV. POLL (June 21, 2021), https://www.monmouth.edu/pollinginstitute/documents/monmouthpoll_us_062121.pdf/.
285. Id.
286. WALDMAN, supra note 276, at 193. The Republican Party often invokes the threat of fraud
as a justification for opposing efforts to increase ballot access. See generally Groarke, supra note
283 (detailing the Republican Party’s rhetoric regarding voter fraud in the 1970s and 1990s).
287. See infra notes 298–304 and accompanying text.
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that restricts the right to vote, Brnovich ensures that the law will likely be
upheld, as long as the state argues that the law is necessary for the prevention
of voter fraud.288 Under the Brnovich factors, it does not matter if a state’s
claims about voter fraud are “tenuous” or “unsupported.”289 As long as a
state alleges the risk of voter fraud, it will suffer “few legal consequences,”
even if its law restricts the right to vote.290
Brnovich is not the first time that a Court decision has validated the
likely discriminatory purpose of a state legislature.291 In Abbott v. Perez,292
the Court considered a Texas redistricting plan that had been under federal
review as mandated by Section 5’s preclearance requirement.293 While the
redistricting plan case was pending, the Court struck down Section 4’s
coverage formula in Shelby County.294 No longer under VRA supervision,
Texas was able to pass its plan, which was arguably enacted with
discriminatory intent.295 When the plan returned to the Supreme Court, the
Court upheld Texas’s plan.296 The Court reasoned that it should presume that
a state acted with “legislative good faith,” even when the state has a history
of past discrimination.297
While Abbott gave states more leeway to engage in partisan actions
when redistricting, Brnovich gave states the green light to suppress voters by
passing restrictive legislation.298 By crafting a voter fraud factor, the Court
created another presumption that will benefit partisan actors in state

288. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2372 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting)
(noting that under the majority’s rule, a state does not even need to show “that the discriminatory
rule it enacted is necessary to prevent the fraud it purports to fear”).
289. Hasen, supra note 268. Arizona’s assertions about the threat of voter fraud were not
supported by any data. See supra note 272 and accompanying text.
290. Hasen, supra note 268; see also Guy-Uriel E. Charles & Luis E. Fuentes Rohwer, The
Court’s Voting-Rights Decision Was Worse than People Think, ATLANTIC (July 8, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2021/07/brnovich-vra-scotus-decision-arizona-votingright/619330/ (arguing that the Brnovich factors “make Section 2 claims less likely to be filed by
plaintiffs, and more likely to be lost when they are”); Joshua Sellers, Brnovich and Its Implications,
REG. REV. (Sep. 20, 2021), https://www.theregreview.org/2021/09/20/sellers-brnovichimplications/ (“[T]he Court’s amplification of the voter fraud canard gives justificatory fodder to
Republican officials in their quest to suppress votes.”).
291. Richard L. Hasen, The Supreme Court’s Pro-Partisanship Turn, 109 GEO. L.J. ONLINE 50,
51 (2020).
292. 138 S. Ct. 2305 (2018).
293. Id. at 2313–14.
294. Id. at 2317.
295. Id. at 2318.
296. Id. at 2313–14.
297. Id. at 2324–25.
298. Hasen, supra note 291, at 59–60.
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legislatures.299 But a presumption of legislative good faith—whether it is
stated outright as in Abbott or rephrased as a “state interest”300 in Brnovich—
is “particularly inappropriate” in the context of voting legislation.301 Election
laws are often passed with “incumbency protection, self-interest, and
partisanship in mind,” so if there is any presumption in election cases, it
should be a presumption “against the state[s].”302 Brnovich did the opposite,
reassuring states that Section 2 challenges to potentially restrictive legislation
will not succeed as long as the state cries “voter fraud.”303 In doing so, the
Court made it clear that it is no longer interested in interpreting Section 2 of
the VRA as written; instead, it is willing to look the other way as states
suppress their voters.304
The “predictable consequences” of weakening the VRA have already
begun to play out.305 As of December 2021, at least nineteen states have
enacted thirty-four laws that restrict ballot access.306 In Texas, the

299. Elaine Kamarck, Voter Suppression or Voter Expansion? What’s Happening and Does It
Matter?, BROOKINGS (Oct. 26, 2021), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2021/10/26/votersuppression-or-voter-expansion-whats-happening-and-does-it-matter/ (“[S]olidly red states tended
to pass restrictive voting laws and solidly blue states tended to pass expansive voting laws.”).
300. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct. 2321, 2340 (2021).
301. Hasen, supra note 291, at 64.
302. Id. at 64–65 (emphasis added); see also Douglas, supra note 258, at 554 (noting that the
Court usually fails to probe the underlying reason for a state’s voting law, “which is often to gain
partisan advantage for the majority party”).
303. Sellers, supra note 290 (“The [Brnovich] guideposts provide judicial cover for voter
suppression efforts, making it harder to bring successful Section 2 claims.”). For now, there is at
least one circumstance in which Section 2 will still work as intended to prevent voter discrimination:
Brnovich does not appear to change the long-standing application of the Gingles factors to vote
dilution cases. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2337. However, plaintiffs in Section 2 vote dilution cases
have “seen diminished success over time.” Ellen D. Katz, Brian Remlinger, Andrew Dziedzic,
Brooke Simone & Jordan Schuler, To Participate and Elect: Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act at
40, UNIV. MICH. L. SCH. VOTING RIGHTS INITIATIVE (2022), https://voting.law.umich.edu
(collecting four decades’ worth of data regarding both vote dilution and vote denial lawsuits brought
under Section 2). Indeed, the Court’s recent decision to stay an Alabama court’s ruling that the
state’s redistricting plan violated Section 2 by diminishing the power of Black voters implies that
the conservative members of the Court are ready and willing to make it harder for plaintiffs to prove
vote dilution claims in addition to vote denial claims. Merrill v. Milligan, 142 S. Ct. 879, 889 (2022)
(mem.) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
304. See Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2365 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (noting that Congress understood
that the interest of preventing voter fraud is easy to assert “groundlessly or pretextually” and thus
amended Section 2 to strike down even facially neutral laws that discriminated against voters of
color); see Strict Scrutiny, supra note 236, at 03:33 (“All five of the [newly created Brnovich]
factors . . . are entirely nontextual.”).
305. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2354 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
306. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 178. Five of these states (Alabama, Arizona,
Georgia, Louisiana, and Texas) were covered by Section 5’s preclearance requirement. U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST., supra note 179. Two more states (New York and Florida) had counties covered by Section
5. Id. The remaining eleven states are Arkansas, Iowa, Kentucky, Oklahoma, Kansas, Montana,
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Republican-controlled state legislature enacted SB 1 under the guise of
preventing voter fraud, even though Texas officials have been unsuccessful
in finding any evidence to support their assertion that fraud threatens Texas
elections.307 Republicans in Georgia took the same approach when passing
the restrictive SB 202 and were similarly unsuccessful in producing evidence
of fraud.308 But under the newly-created Brnovich factor, which encourages
a court to “close[] its eyes to the facts on the ground,” it does not matter if a
state can prove that voter fraud has happened or even is likely to happen.309
Under Brnovich, a state can pass any legislation it likes to combat this
imaginary threat.310
3. The Court’s Explicit Listing of Voter Fraud as a State Interest
Suggests that Its Decision-Making Process Is Divorced from
Reality
In addition to providing states with a framework for passing legislation
that suppresses voters, the Brnovich Court’s voter fraud factor is concerning
for another reason: It suggests that the Court has bought into the increasingly
partisan and patently false rhetoric surrounding voter fraud.311
Although there is no evidence to support the allegation that voter fraud
poses any threat to American elections, the Republican Party has seized on
voter fraud as reason to support restrictive voting laws.312 This is not a new
phenomenon.313 Since the contentious presidential election of 2000,
Republican politicians have consistently used the “phantom threat” of voter

Idaho, Indiana, New Hampshire, Wyoming, Utah, and Nevada. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra
note 178.
307. See supra notes 187–193 and accompanying text. The preamble to the bill states that the
changes in the law are “enacted solely to prevent fraud in the electoral process.” Corasaniti, supra
note 188.
308. See supra notes 180–186 and accompanying text; see also David Wickert, Lawsuits Failed,
but Bills May Restrict Georgia Voting, ATLANTA J.-CONST. (March 12, 2021),
https://www.ajc.com/politics/georgia-state-legislature/failed-lawsuits-paved-the-way-for-georgiavoting-restriction-bills/RH232D64CBFZPPT3Z2ZIMJLPJE/ (“[A]llegations of widespread voter
fraud [in Georgia] wilted under scrutiny.”).
309. Brnovich, 141 S. Ct. at 2366 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
310. Hasen, supra note 268 (emphasizing that under Brnovich, “[s]tates don’t have to prove
fraud at all”).
311. Marc Elias, Republicans Are Manufacturing Fake Fraud, DEMOCRACY DOCKET (Oct. 25,
2021), https://www.democracydocket.com/news/republicans-are-manufacturing-fake-fraud/.
312. Id.; see also Wickert, supra note 308 (“Trump and the Georgia Republican Party . . . say
negligence and misconduct allowed tens of thousands of illegal voters to steal the election.”).
313. See Groarke, supra note 283, at 571 (explaining that the strategy of using fears of fraud to
“constrict the electorate” dates back at least to the Progressive Era).
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fraud to stir up fear about American elections.314 Voter fraud rhetoric reached
a fever pitch in the 2020 election, with Republican politicians predicting that
an increase in absentee voting would lead to an inaccurate election.315 And
although the 2020 election was actually the most secure in American history,
the dangerous consequences of spreading lies about voter fraud quickly
became obvious.316 On January 6, 2021, Trump supporters who believed the
2020 election had been stolen attacked the U.S. Capitol with the goal of
getting a “resolution on these voter corruption issues.”317 Two months after
the Capitol Riot, belief in voter fraud was still strong: A March 2021 poll
showed that six in ten Republicans believed the election was “stolen” from
Donald Trump.318
The Court’s explicit reference to voter fraud is extremely concerning
because it suggests that the Court is ignoring the plethora of data that points
to American elections being secure.319 All the evidence available points to
the fact that any voter fraud that does exist occurs on such a miniscule scale
that it has no impact on election outcomes.320 But the lack of data does not
seem to matter to the conservative members of the Court.321 Indeed, in a
troubling dissent to a different election case, Justice Thomas asserted that the
growing trend of “permissive” absentee voting—that is, allowing more voters

314. Waldman, supra note 276, at 183; see also Berman, supra note 49, at 222 (“After the 2004
election, Republicans intensified their drive to restrict access to the ballot by hyping the threat of
voter fraud.”).
315. Louis Jacobson & Amy Sherman, Donald Trump Says Joe Biden Can Only Win by a
‘Rigged Election.’ That’s Wrong in Several Ways, POLITIFACT (Aug. 24, 2020),
https://www.politifact.com/factchecks/2020/aug/24/donald-trump/donald-trump-says-joe-bidencan-only-win-rigged-el/.
316. Joint Statement from Elections Infrastructure Government Coordinating Council & The
Election Infrastructure Sector Coordinating Executive Committees, CYBERSECURITY &
INFRASTRUCTURE AGENCY (Nov. 12, 2021), https://www.cisa.gov/news/2020/11/12/jointstatement-elections-infrastructure-government-coordinating-council-election.
317. Greg Miller, Greg Jaffe & Razzan Nakhlawi, A Mob Insurrection Stoked by False Claims
of Election Fraud and Promises of Violent Restoration, WASH. POST (Jan. 9, 2021),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/trump-capitol-mob-attackorigins/2021/01/09/0cb2cf5e-51d4-11eb-83e3-322644d82356_story.html.
318. James Oliphant & Chris Kahn, Half of Republicans Believe False Accounts of Deadly U.S.
Capitol Riot, REUTERS (Apr. 5, 2021), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-politicsdisinformation-idUSKBN2BS0RZ?taid=606af4c8a0a3570001acce1f&utm_campaign=
trueAnthem:+Trending+Content&utm_medium=trueAnthem&utm_source=twitter.
319. See supra note 271.
320. See supra note 271.
321. Like Shelby County, the Brnovich Court split along ideological lines, with Justices Breyer
and Sotomayor joining Justice Kagan’s dissent. Brnovich v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 141 S. Ct.
2321, 2350 (2021) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
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to vote by mail—“vastly” increases the risk of fraud.322 These statements,
combined with the Court’s outright legitimization of voter fraud prevention
in Brnovich, indicate a willingness to uphold any state legislation that can be
justified by a state’s interest in preventing voter fraud, even if the fraud is
nonexistent and even if the law makes it harder for voters to cast a ballot.323
Furthermore, in creating a voter fraud factor, the Court is irresponsibly
contributing to the dangerous inflation of the “threat” of voter fraud.324 Our
country has already seen the violent consequences that result when those in
positions of authority spread false allegations of fraud.325 By crafting a voter
fraud factor in the absence of any evidence of fraud, the Court is lending
legitimacy to the fringe groups and Republican politicians who know that
voter fraud accusations are an easy way to get their supporters fired up.326
State legislatures have already realized that there is political advantage
associated with passing legislation under the guise of preventing fraud, and
with the Brnovich decision, they have the Court’s blessing to pursue new
voting restrictions.327
C. Congress Must Pass Federal Voting Rights Legislation
Brnovich makes it clear that the Court can no longer be relied upon to
uphold what is left of the VRA.328 Instead of following its own VRA
precedent, the Court has allowed itself to be swayed by Republican talking
points.329 The recent surge of restrictive voting laws also makes it clear that

322. Republican Party of Pa. v. Degraffenreid, 141 S. Ct. 732, 735 (2021) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting). The case concerned a Pennsylvania decision to extend the deadline for accepting
absentee ballots but was dismissed by the Court as moot. Id. at 1.
323. Hasen, supra note 268.
324. Sellers, supra note 290.
325. See supra notes 317–318 and accompanying text.
326. Sheera Frenkel, How Misinformation ‘Superspreaders’ Seed False Election Theories, N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
23,
2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/23/technology/electionmisinformation-facebook-twitter.html; see supra notes 282–286 and accompanying text. The
Court’s treatment of voter fraud is even more concerning in light of text messages and emails that
show Ginni Thomas, the wife of Justice Clarence Thomas, repeatedly urging White House officials
and lawmakers to overturn the 2020 election, alleging fraud. Bob Woodward & Robert Costa,
Virginia Thomas Urged White House Chief to Pursue Unrelenting Efforts to Overturn the 2020
Election,
Texts
Show,
WASH.
POST
(Mar.
24,
2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2022/03/24/virginia-thomas-mark-meadows-texts/;
Emma Brown, Ginni Thomas, Wife of Supreme Court Justice, Pressed Ariz. Lawmakers to Help
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Trump’s
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Show,
WASH.
POST
(May
20,
2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/investigations/2022/05/20/ginni-thomas-arizona-electionemails/.
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328. See supra Sections II.A.1–2.
329. See supra Section II.B.2.
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individual states cannot be trusted to protect equal access to the ballot box.330
Although some states have passed legislation that makes it easier to vote,331
many states have jumped at the chance to pass legislation that disparately
impacts voters of color.332 To combat these disenfranchisement efforts,
Congress must take action by passing federal voting rights legislation.333
The legislation best poised to restore VRA protections is the John Lewis
Voting Rights Advancement Act (HR 4).334 While the other two bills, HR 1
and S.2747, would nationalize many voting methods, HR 4 would rebuild
and improve the VRA.335 Because HR 4 does not create federal rules that
would dictate how states can run their elections, HR 4 respects state power
over elections—as long as states do not use that power to discriminate against
voters of color.336
HR 4 specifically addresses the shortcomings of Section 4’s coverage
formula.337 First, HR 4’s coverage formula would update each year, so that
only states with persistent, recent violations are covered.338 HR 4’s coverage
formula is designed to use current data instead of relying on Congress to
make changes during reauthorization.339 In this way, HR 4 would respond to
the concerns that led the Court to declare Section 4 unconstitutional in Shelby
County.340 Second, HR 4’s coverage formula would apply to all fifty states,

330. See supra Section I.C.1.
331. Between January 1 and December 7, 2021, twenty-five states enacted legislation that
expanded voting access. BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST., supra note 178.
332. See supra note 306. Many of these restrictive laws reduce the availability of alternative
methods of voting, like absentee ballots and early voting, which creates disproportionately longer
wait times at polling places that serve voters of color. See, e.g., M. Keith Chen et al., Racial
Disparities in Voting Wait Times: Evidence from Smartphone Data, 2–61 (NAT’L BUREAU OF
ECON. RSCH., Working Paper No. 26487, 2020) (finding that residents of Black neighborhoods were
74% more likely than residents of white neighborhoods to spend more than 30 minutes at their
polling place).
333. Elias, supra note 311 (“Only Congress can enact national legislation to stamp out the
scourge of fake fraud now infecting state election codes. The time is now for it to act.”).
334. See supra Section I.C.2; John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, H.R. 4, 117th Cong.
(2021). As of January 2022, Democrats in Congress have combined HR 4 and S.2747 and are
attempting a procedural maneuver to bring the bills for a vote. Mike DeBonis, Schumer Sets Up
Final Senate Confrontation on Voting Rights and the Filibuster, WASH. POST (Jan. 12, 2022),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/senate-voting-rights-schumer/2022/01/12/a348723873e4-11ec-b202-b9b92330d4fa_story.html.
335. See supra Section I.C.2; see generally John Lewis Voting Rights Advancement Act, H.R.
4, 117th Cong. (2021).
336. See supra notes 255–258 and accompanying text.
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which means that the Court cannot bring an “equal sovereignty” argument
and allege that it unfairly burdens certain states but not others.341 A coverage
formula that applies everywhere will also protect voters in states like Iowa,
which recently enacted restrictive voting laws but was never included in
Section 4’s coverage formula.342
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that HR 4 will pass the Senate.343 Like most
issues in our current political climate, support for federal voting rights
legislation splits along party lines, with Democrats significantly more likely
to support legislation that protects or expands the right to vote.344 However,
the Republican Party restricts voting access at its own peril.345
Studies have shown that initiatives that make voting easier do not
advantage one political party over the other.346 And results from November
2021 state elections support the idea that widened ballot access can help
Republican candidates just as much as Democratic candidates.347 For
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Iowa
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example, in 2020, Virginia made it easier to vote by repealing its voter ID
law and expanding the early voting period.348 These laws were enacted by a
Democratic-controlled state legislature and signed into law by a Democratic
governor, but it was Republican candidates who benefitted from a more
accessible voting process.349 Virginia saw the highest turnout in a state
election since 1997,350 and voters elected a Republican governor for the first
time since 2009.351 Republicans also saw large gains in New Jersey,352 where
Democratic legislators successfully expanded the state’s early voting period
in April 2021.353
Conventional wisdom dictates that Republicans support voter
restrictions because doing so helps them win.354 But the recent Virginia and
New Jersey elections suggest that laws that protect and expand the right to
vote do not necessarily benefit one party over the other.355 Perhaps reframing
the issue of voting rights as one that can help turn out their own voters will
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convince Republican politicians that expanding ballot access is a cause
worthy of their support.
III. CONCLUSION
Since its founding, America has had a shameful history of voter
discrimination.356 For nearly fifty years, the VRA worked as intended to
correct that history.357 But with Section 4’s coverage formula and Section
5’s preclearance requirement struck down in Shelby County, and Section 2
significantly weakened in Brnovich, the Supreme Court has put our country
back on the road to a voting landscape that restricts the right to vote in a way
that disparately impacts voters of color.358 The Court’s creation of a voter
fraud factor paves the way for states to pass restrictive voting legislation, and
many states have done just that.359
These restrictive laws pose a major roadblock in America’s journey to
becoming a more perfect union.360 If America is to live up to its ideals, our
leaders must remember that all other rights, “even the most basic, are illusory
if the right to vote is undermined.”361 Now is the time for Congress to realize
that both parties benefit when voting rights are protected, and both parties
lose when those rights are restricted. If it waits too long, who knows where
America will end up.
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